A Mixed Duopoly with a Lifetime Employment Contract as a Strategic Commitment

This paper examines the behaviors of a profit-maximizing private firm and a socialwelfare- maximizing public firm in a mixed market model with a lifetime employment contract as a strategic commitment. The paper then shows that there exists an equilibrium in which the private firm enters into a lifetime employment contract with its employees while the public firm does not.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Ohnishi, Kazuhiro
Published in:	FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis. - ISSN 0015-2218. - Vol. 62.2006, 1, p. 108-123
Subject:	mixed duopoly \| lifetime employment contract \| Cournot model

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	H42 - Publicly Provided Private Goods ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582136