A model of partisan central banks and opportunistic political business cycles
Year of publication: |
1997
|
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Authors: | Sieg, Gernot |
Published in: |
European journal of political economy. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0176-2680, ZDB-ID 623005-2. - Vol. 13.1997, 3, p. 503-516
|
Subject: | Politischer Konjunkturzyklus | Political business cycle | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Central bank independence | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Signalling | Theorie | Theory |
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