A multiplicative model of optimal CEO incentives in market equilibrium
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Edmans, Alex ; Gabaix, Xavier ; Landier, Augustin |
Published in: |
The review of financial studies. - Cary, NC : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 0893-9454, ZDB-ID 1043666-2. - Vol. 22.2009, 12, p. 4881-4917
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Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Theorie | Theory |
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