A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites

We analyze the problem of a jury that must rank a set of contestants whose socially optimal ranking is common knowledge among jurors who may have friends among the contestants and may, therefore, be biased in their friends' favor. We show a natural mechanism that is finite and complete informational, with no simultaneous moves (i.e., it is solvable by backward induction), which implements the socially optimal ranking with subgame perfect equilibria.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Adachi, Tsuyoshi
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 87.2014, C, p. 508-518
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Implementation theory \| Backward induction \| Subgame perfect equilibrium

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931204