A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
We analyze the problem of a jury choosing the winner from a set of agents when the identity of the deserving winner is common knowledge amongst the jurors but each juror is biased in favor of one different agent. We propose a simple and natural mechanism that implements the socially optimal rule (the winner is the deserving winner) in subgame perfect equilibria.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Amorós, Pablo |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 110.2011, 3, p. 241-244
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Mechanism design Contest Subgame perfect equilibrium |
Saved in:
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