A nearly optimal auction for an uninformed seller
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Lazzati, Natalia ; Van Essen, Matt |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 122.2014, 3, p. 396-399
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Optimal auction | Probability elicitation | Mechanism design |
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