A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Akahoshi, Takashi |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 43.2014, 3, p. 683-702
|
Subject: | Matching | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Theorie | Theory |
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