A necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the socially stable core in structured TU-games
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Cesco, Juan C. |
Published in: |
International game theory review. - [River Edge], NJ [u.a.] : World Scientific, ISSN 0219-1989, ZDB-ID 1500913-0. - Vol. 11.2009, 3, p. 383-389
|
Subject: | Core | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Theorie | Theory | Transferierbarer Nutzen | Transferable utility |
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