A Negotiation-Based Model of Tax-Induced Transfer Pricing

We present a new model of tax induced transfer pricing as an alterna- tive to the oft-used concealment model. Inspired by interviews with practi- tioners, we consider a large multinational firm which is audited by the tax authority in the high-tax location. When this country adjusts the transfer prices proposed by the firm, the low-tax location may dispute this decision and initiate negotiations. Since negotiations are costly, the high-tax loca- tion sets a transfer price that prevents the low-tax location from entering negotiations. We compare this model's predictions to those of the conceal- ment model. The negotiation model replicates the predictions on the tax rate effects on transfer pricing, while adding new predictions. Profit shifting is expected to fall in the high-tax country's bargaining power and to rise in firm profits and domestic firm ownership in both countries. Most impor- tantly, profit shifting occurs even if tax enforcement is perfect. We analyze the effects of an introduction of a common consolidated corporate tax base with formula apportionment and conclude that the negotiation model may change the perspective on such a policy. Specifically, strong countries with large bargaining power may find this reform unappealing.