A New and Robust Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of Triadic Power Relations.

We present a new subgame perfect equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game, which has Basu's triadic model as the stage game. The payoff for the laborer is the same as in Basu's model. The equilibrium is more robust than the solution in Naqvi and Wemhoner in the sense that the equilibrium does not require the same high degree of rationality; simple well-known strategies are applied, and both the lanklord and the merchant are better of than in the stage game.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Hatlebakk, M.
Institutions:	Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen
Subject:	GAMES \| LABOUR \| POWER GENERATION

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Series:	Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	12 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development ; Q12 - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783569