A New Explanation of Arms Races in the Third World: A Differential Game Model

This paper examines the stability of arms races in the Third World countries and assumes that the utility function is separable between the consumption and the weapon stocks. We find that the military expenditures and the weapon stocks will exhibit stability and overshooting takes place for the optimal control models. Moreover, we prove that the differential game model has an unstable equilibrium, a result opposite of Deger and Sen (1984).

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Lee, Cheng-Te
Published in:	Journal of Economics and Management. - College of Business, ISSN 1819-0917. - Vol. 3.2007, 2, p. 161-176
Publisher:	College of Business
Subject:	arms race \| differential game model

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Extent:	application/pdf text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008555940