A New Old Solution for Weak Tournaments
Year of publication: |
2010-05
|
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Authors: | Anesi, Vincent |
Institutions: | Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), School of Economics |
Subject: | Electoral competition | stable set | stationary Markov equilibrium | weak tournament | solution theory |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | Discussion Papers. - ISSN 1749-3293. |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 2010-08 |
Classification: | C71 - Cooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior |
Source: |
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A New Old Solution for Weak Tournaments
Anesi, Vincent, (2010)
-
A new old solution for weak tournaments
Anesi, Vincent, (2010)
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A New Old Solution for Weak Tournaments
Anesi, Vincent, (2010)
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