A new solution for the moral hazard problem in team production
Pablo Guillen; Danielle Merrett; Robert Slonim
| Year of publication: |
2015
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Guillén, Pablo ; Merrett, Danielle ; Slonim, Robert |
| Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 61.2015, 7, p. 1514-1530
|
| Subject: | team production | moral hazard | free riding | public goods | intergroup competition | voluntary contributions mechanism | economic experiments | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Trittbrettfahrerverhalten | Free rider problem | Experiment | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304127