A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules
We introduce a game form that captures a noncooperative dimension of the consistency property of bankruptcy rules. Any consistent and monotone rule is fully characterized by a bilateral principle and consistency. Like the consistency axiom, our game form, together with a bilateral principle, yields the corresponding consistent bankruptcy rule as a result of a unique outcome of Nash equilibria. The result holds for a large class of consistent and monotone rules, including the Constrained Equal Award, the Propositional Rule, and many other well known rules. Moreover, all of the subgame perfect equilibria are coalition-proof in the associated game in strategic form.
Year of publication: |
1997-01-01
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Authors: | Volij, Oscar ; Dagan, Nir ; Serrano, Roberto |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, Iowa State University |
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