A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining.
The authors explore a sequential offers model of n-person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting. Their focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor 'delta' is sufficiently large. It is shown that delay and the formation of inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium, the latter for some or all orders of proposer. However, efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core as 'delta' approaches one. Strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently high 'delta'. Copyright 1993 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
Year of publication: |
1993
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Authors: | Chatterjee, Kalyan ; Dutta, Bhaskar ; Ray, Debraj ; Sengupta, Kunal |
Published in: |
Review of Economic Studies. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0034-6527. - Vol. 60.1993, 2, p. 463-77
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
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