A Note on Common Agency Models of Moral Hazard
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Attar, Andrea ; Piaser, Gwenael ; Porteiro, Nicolas |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Wirtschaftswissenschaft | Economics |
Description of contents: |
We consider Common Agency games of moral hazard and we suggest that there is only a very weak support for the standard restriction to take-it or leave-it contracts
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