A note on Condorcet consistency and the median voter

by Berno Buechel

We discuss to which extent the median voter theorem extends to the domain of single-peaked preferences on median spaces. After observing that on this domain a Condorcet winner need not exist, we show that if a Condorcet winner does exist, then it coincides with the median alternative ("the median voter"). Based on this result, we propose two non-cooperative games that implement the unique strategy-proof social choice rule on this domain.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Buechel, Berno
Publisher:	Karlsruhe : KIT [u.a.]
Subject:	Condorcet-Paradoxon \| Paradox of voting \| Medianwähler-Modell \| Median voter \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 9 S., 1,06 MB)
Series:	Working paper series in economics. - Karlsruhe : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 2190-9806, ZDB-ID 2573087-3. - Vol. 17
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzung: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/44977 [Handle]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008935661