A Note on Contribution Games with Loss Functions

Decisions on joint funding of continuous public goods between two agents often involve heterogeneous targets. We introduce loss functions in a contribution game in order to study the effect of this conflict. Unlike Varian (1994), joint contribution occurs only if the players’ targets are sufficiently close and the sequential game reduces free riding problems, while total contribution is higher in the simultaneous game.

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Year of publication:	2011-12-20
Authors:	Russo, Giuseppe ; Senatore, Luigi
Institutions:	Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF)
Subject:	Public Goods \| Intergovernmental Relations

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CSEF Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Published in Economics Letters, 2012, 115(2), 211–214
Classification:	H41 - Public Goods ; H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009402137