A Note on Forward Induction in a Model of Representative Democracy.

The citizen-debate approach, proposed to study the performance of representative democracies, builds on a multi-stage game where the same agents are asked whether or not to become a candidate and, successively, to vote. Consistently, the solution concept adopted in Besley and Coate (1997) conforms to backward induction rationality. In this note we remark that it does not conform to forward induction rationality.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	De Sinopoli, F.
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	GAME THEORY \| VOTING

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Series:	Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	12 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779531