A note on information of firms and collusion

We study the effect of more information of firms about consumers' preferences on collusion sustainability within a differentiated Hotelling duopoly. We show that the increase of information may increase or decrease collusion sustainability, depending on the type of information involved (shared information or unshared information), on the characteristics of the information distribution, and on the product differentiation degree.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Colombo, Stefano
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 30.2010, 2, p. 1603-1608
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Tacit collusion \| Information \| Horizontal differentiation \| Hotelling

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	L4 - Antitrust Policy
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008493982