A note on non-competes, bargaining and training by firms

This paper analyzes how non-competes, via wage bargaining, can affect firmsâ€™ incentives to provide their employees with on-the-job training. The results show that non-competes increase incentives to provide general training, but reduce those related to specific training.

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Year of publication:	2008-01-01
Authors:	Meccheri, Nicola
Institutions:	Dipartimento di Economia e Management, Università degli Studi di Pisa
Subject:	non-competes \| bargaining \| general training \| specific training

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	J24 - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets ; K31 - Labor Law
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005769616