A note on noncompetes, bargaining and training by firms
This paper analyzes how noncompetes, via wage bargaining, can affect firms' incentives to provide their employees with on-the-job training. The results show that noncompetes increase incentives to provide general training, but reduce those related to specific training.
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Meccheri, Nicola |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 102.2009, 3, p. 198-200
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Noncompetes Bargaining General training Specific training |
Saved in:
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