A note on optimal contracting with public ex post information under limited liability
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Danau, Daniel ; Vinella, Annalisa |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 49.2020, 1, p. 47-74
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Subject: | Informative signals | Limited liability | Incentive compatibility | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Beschränkte Haftung | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Signalling | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Haftung | Liability | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information |
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