A Note on Renegotiation in Repeated Bertrand Duopolies

Weak Renegotiation-Proofness (WRP) singles out marginal cost pricing as a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly. We show that, with a discrete strategy space, WRP does not eliminate any relevant subgame perfect equilibrium outcome

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Andersson, Ola ; Wengström, Erik
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Duopol \| Duopoly \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Verhandlungen \| Negotiations
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economics Letters, Vol. 95, No. 3, 2007 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 28, 2006 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014178724