A note on the exclusion principle

According to the so-called Exclusion Principle (introduced by Baye et alii, 1993), it might be profitable for the seller to reduce the number of (fullyinformed) potential bidders in an all-pay auction. We show that the Exclusion Principle does not apply if the seller regards the bidders' private valuations as belonging to the class of identical and independent distributions with a monotonic hazard rate.

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Bertoletti, Paolo
Publisher:	Pavia : Università degli Studi di Pavia, Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Metodi Quantitativi (EPMQ)
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Interessenpolitik \| all-pay auctions \| Exclusion Principle \| monotonic hazard rate \| economic theory of lobbying

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Series:	Quaderni di Dipartimento - EPMQ ; 179
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	512190542 [GVK] hdl:10419/87141 [Handle]
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326123