A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set when individual preferences are weak orders
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Andjiga, Nicolas G. ; Moyouwou, Issofa |
Published in: |
Mathematical social sciences. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : NH, Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896, ZDB-ID 283230-6. - Vol. 52.2006, 1, p. 67-76
|
Subject: | Abstimmung | Voting | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Theorie | Theory |
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