A Note on the Nonexistence of a Rationing Equilibrium in the Besanko-Thakor Model.
It is shown that in a credit market with two types of borrowers, distinguished only through their not commonly known probability of default, and with a perfectly elastic supply of deposits, a pair of contracts with random rationing of less risky loan applicants cannot be a Nash-equilibrium. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Year of publication: |
1993
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Authors: | Clemenz, Gerhard |
Published in: |
International Economic Review. - Department of Economics. - Vol. 34.1993, 3, p. 727-37
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Publisher: |
Department of Economics |
Saved in:
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