A note on the stochastic stability of equilibrium in some exchange economies.

Building upon recent work of Gintis, we study evolutionary dynamics in an economy with Leontieff preferences and corner endowments for which the equilibrium is completely indeterminate. We exhibit a class of dynamics which selects, via stochastic stability, the equilibrium minimizing the quantities traded.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2009-12
Authors:	Mandel, Antoine ; Botta, Nicola
Institutions:	Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne, Université Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne)
Subject:	Exchange economies \| bargaining games \| equilibrium selection \| stochastic stability

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne. - ISSN 1955-611X.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	17 pages
Classification:	D51 - Exchange and Production Economies ; C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; C63 - Computational Techniques ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008622022