A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems

This paper considers marriage problems, roommate problems with nonempty core, and college admissions problems with responsive preferences. All stochastically stable matchings are shown to be contained in the set of matchings which are most robust to one-shot deviation.

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Year of publication:	2013-06
Authors:	Newton, Jonathan ; Sawa, Ryoji
Institutions:	School of Economics, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Subject:	Learning \| stochastic stability \| matching \| marriage \| college admission

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Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series University of Sydney Economics Discussion Papers Number 2013-09
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272071