A partial folk theorem for games with private learning
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Wiseman, Thomas |
Published in: |
Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 7.2012, 2, p. 217-239
|
Publisher: |
New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society |
Subject: | Repeated games | learning | folk theorem |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Article |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE913 [DOI] 89474898X [GVK] hdl:10419/150170 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:913 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge |
Source: |
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A partial folk theorem for games with private learning
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