A Partisanship Theory of Fiscal and Monetary Regimes.
This paper indicates that income redistribution, motivated by the distributive ideals of liberal political p arties, create unanticipated disincentives for productive effort. Thi s suggests that newly-elected liberal parties are likely to engage in monetary surprises in order to compensate for the adverse effects of these disincentives on real income. Estimated reaction from function s support these predictions. A measure of income redistribution, the change in the ratio of the social expenditures of government to GNP, has a positive significant effect on money growth. In addition, when the Presidency changes from conservative to liberal, there is a posit ive and significant increase on money growth. Copyright 1987 by Ohio State University Press.
Year of publication: |
1987
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Authors: | Havrilesky, Thomas M |
Published in: |
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. - Blackwell Publishing. - Vol. 19.1987, 3, p. 308-25
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Publisher: |
Blackwell Publishing |
Saved in:
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