A Passion for Voting

We model expressive voting as a dynamic game with informed and ignorant voters. A voter has selective memory for actions and he is aware of it. We find the unique symmetric equilibrium with ignorant voting. Public signal in favor of one particular alternative creates the bandwagon and underdog effects. When the signal is su ciently strong, the majority outcome is biased. This is a possible reason for persistence of public policies

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Panova, Elena
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] ; Abstract [doi.org]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 7, 2011 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1805067 [DOI]
Classification:	D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; P16 - Political Economy
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014183748