A Path Following Procedure for Finding a Point in the Core of a Balanced N-Person Game
A basic theorem in n-person game theory due to Scarf states that a balanced game has a nonempty core. Scarf's proof presents a procedure to find a point in the core of a discrete game, where every coalition disposes of a finite number of alternatives. The proof for a general game follows by passing to the limit. In this paper we present a procedure which works with the characteristic sets in original form. They no longer need to be approximated. The procedure consists in following a finite sequence of possibly nonlinear paths. The framework adopted for this paper is more general than needed to treat the core problem. This enables us to present a unified approach treating the latter problem as well as related problems in linear complementarity theory and fixed point computation.
Year of publication: |
1980-12
|
---|---|
Authors: | Heyden, Ludo Van der |
Institutions: | Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Logrolling and Budget Allocation Games
Shubik, Martin, (1977)
-
Algorithms for the Linear Complementarity Problem Which Allow an Arbitrary Starting Point
Talman, Dolf A.J.J., (1981)
-
General Equilibrium with Wage Rigidities: An Application to Belgium
Ginsburgh, Victor, (1984)
- More ...