A positive theory of discretionary policy, the cost of democratic government and the benefits of a constitution
Year of publication: |
1986
|
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Authors: | Cukierman, Alex |
Other Persons: | Meltzer, Allan H. (contributor) |
Published in: |
Economic inquiry : journal of the Western Economic Association International. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0095-2583, ZDB-ID 191139-9. - Vol. 24.1986, 3, p. 367-388
|
Subject: | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | Economic theory of democracy | Regelbindung versus Diskretion | Rules versus discretion | Soziale Kosten | Social costs | Theorie | Theory |
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