A PRINCIPAL-AGENT APPROACH TO THE DELEGATION OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY

This paper applies a multi-tasking model of moral hazard to study the delegation of regulatory authority for health and environmental risks. The model characterizes the conditions under which single and multiple bureaucratic agencies are optimal, and relates these findings to discussions of appropriate regulation of agricultural biotechnology

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Alevy, Jonathan E.
Institutions:	Agricultural and Applied Economics Association - AAEA
Subject:	Political Economy

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL Number 20764
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005807713