A principal-agent model of contracting in major league baseball
Year of publication: |
2004
|
---|---|
Authors: | Miceli, Thomas J. |
Published in: |
Journal of sports economics. - Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage, ISSN 1527-0025, ZDB-ID 2006891-8. - Vol. 5.2004, 1, p. 213-220
|
Subject: | Profisport | Professional sports | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
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