A principal-agent model of sequential testing
Year of publication: |
September 2012
|
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Authors: | Gerardi, Dino ; Maestri, Lucas Jóver |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 7.2012, 3, p. 425-463
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Subject: | Dynamic mechanism design | information acquisition | sequential testing | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE914 [DOI] hdl:10419/150176 [Handle] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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