A property of Nash equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information
Year of publication: |
1997
|
---|---|
Authors: | Forges, Françoise |
Other Persons: | Minelli, Enrico (contributor) |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 18.1997, 2, p. 159-175
|
Subject: | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Theorie | Theory |
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