¿A qué juegan el gobierno y un banco central independiente?
Year of publication: |
1994
|
---|---|
Authors: | Vargas H., Hernando |
Published in: |
Ensayos sobre política económica. - Bogotá : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 0120-4483, ZDB-ID 734865-4. - 1994, p. 93-124
|
Subject: | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Central bank independence | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Theorie | Theory |
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