A Ramsey Bound on Stable Sets in Jordan Pillage Games

Jordan [2006] defined ‘pillage games’, a class of cooperative games whose dominance operator is represented by a ‘power function’ satisfying coalitional and resource monotonicity axioms. In this environment, he proved that stable sets must be finite. We use graph theory to reinterpret this result, tightening the bound, highlighting the role played by resource monotonicity, and suggesting a strategy for yet tighter bounds.

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Year of publication:	2009-05
Authors:	Kerber, Manfred ; Rowat, Colin
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Birmingham
Subject:	Pillage \| cooperative game theory \| stable sets

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Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	7 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; P14 - Property Rights
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012261