A Re-Interpretation of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions
Year of publication: |
2003-11-19
|
---|---|
Authors: | Carmona, Guilherme |
Institutions: | EconWPA |
Subject: | Nash equilibrium | discounted repeated games | semi-perfect equilibrium | global stability | finite automata | social norms |
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