A recursive core for cooperative games with overlapping coalitions

This paper develops an extension of the recursive core to the setting of overlapping coalitions. We show that the cooperative game theoretical traditional way of separating a deviant coalition from the game played by the ones left behind is no more satisfactory. We therefore introduce a new paradigm with which we obtain the overlapping coalition structure core whose allocations are Pareto-efficient.

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Year of publication:	2014-10
Authors:	Agbaglah, Messan
Institutions:	Département d'économique, Faculté d'administration
Subject:	Overlapping coalitions \| Cover function game \| Recursive core \| Residual game \| Optimistic \| Pessimistic \| Efficiency

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cahiers de recherche.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	18 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C71 - Cooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010942760