A Remark on Bargaining and Non-Expected Utility

We show that a bargaining game of alternating offers with exogenous risk of breakdown and played by dynamically consistent non-expected utility maximizers is formally equivalent to Rubinstein's (1982) game with time preference. Within this game, the behavior of dynamically consistent players is indistinguishable from the behavior of expected utility maximizers.

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Year of publication:	2002-01-23
Authors:	Volij, Oscar
Institutions:	Oscar Volij
Subject:	Bargaining \| non-expected utility

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economic theory and game theory.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 44(1), 1-15, September 2002.
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357969