A Repeated Game Heterogeneous-Agent Wage-Posting Model

In the paper we simulate a heterogeneous-agent version of the wage-posting model as derived by Montgomery (1991) with homogeneous workers and differently-productive employers. Wage policy of particular employer is positively correlated with employer's productivity level and the wage policy of the competitor. However, it is a less productive employer whose wage posting could also outweigh the posting of a more productive employer, though only temporarily

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Steinbacher, Matej
Other Persons:	Steinbacher, Matjaz (contributor) ; Steinbacher, Mitja (contributor)
Publisher:	[2009]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (8 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 3, 2009 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1443224 [DOI]
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; C15 - Statistical Simulation Methods; Monte Carlo Methods ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty ; J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013157488