A replication of "Agency problems of excess endowment holdings in not-for-profit firms" (journal of accounting and economics, 2006)
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Calabrese, Thad ; Gupta, Anubhav |
Other Persons: | Core, John E. (contributor) ; Guay, Wayne R. (contributor) ; Verdi, Rodrigo S. (contributor) |
Published in: |
Public finance review : PFR. - Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage, ISSN 1552-7530, ZDB-ID 2070401-X. - Vol. 47.2019, 4, p. 747-774
|
Subject: | corporate governance | nonprofit organizations | cash holdings | endowment | agency problems | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Nonprofit-Organisation | Nonprofit organization | Theorie | Theory |
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