A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction

This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Perry, Motty ; Wolfstetter, Elmar ; Zamir, Shmuel
Publisher:	Berlin : Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
Subject:	Auctions

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Series:	SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; 1998,63
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	721986854 [GVK] hdl:10419/61249 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199863 [RePEc]
Classification:	D44 - Auctions
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010309861