A Second-Best Mechanism for Land Assembly
Year of publication: |
2010-08-17
|
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Authors: | Grossman, Zachary ; Pincus, Jonathan ; Shapiro, Perry |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, University of California-Santa Barbara (UCSB) |
Subject: | land assembly | assembly problems | complementary goods | holdout | property rights | mechanism design | desirable properties | impossibility theorem | second-best characterization | SP mechanism | second-price auction | just compensation | local externalities | public-private partnerships | Social and Behavioral Sciences | Other Economics |
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