A sequential approach to the characteristic function and the core in games with externalities
Year of publication: |
2003
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Authors: | Currarini, Sergio ; Marini, Marco |
Published in: |
Advances in economic design : with 28 tables. - Berlin : Springer, ISBN 3-540-00267-7. - 2003, p. 233-249
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Subject: | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Externer Effekt | Externalities | Kartell | Cartel | Oligopol | Oligopoly | Preiswettbewerb | Price competition | Theorie | Theory |
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