A short note on joint welfare maximization assumptions

Non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) use the assumption that coalition of signatories maximize their joint welfare. The joint maxi- mization assumption is compared with di®erent sharing pro¯t schemes such as Shapley value, Nash bargaining solution and Consensus Value. The results show that the joint welfare max- imization assumption is similar with Nash Bargaining solution.

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Year of publication:	2007-10
Authors:	Osmani, Dritan ; Tol, Richard S.J.
Institutions:	Forschungsstelle Nachhaltige Umweltentwicklung (ZMK), Universität Hamburg
Subject:	game theory \| coalition formation \| joint welfare maximization \| Shapley value \| Nash bargaining solution \| Consensus Value \| international environmental agreements

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number FNU-150 19 pages
Classification:	C02 - Mathematical Methods ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463821