A signaling theory of congressional oversight
Year of publication: |
1993
|
---|---|
Authors: | Cameron, Charles Metz |
Other Persons: | Rosendorff, B. Peter (contributor) |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 5.1993, 1, p. 44-70
|
Subject: | Verwaltungskontrolle | Political control | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
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